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The article compares Russian and Japanese approaches to security on and around the Ko-
rean Peninsula from the viewpoint of the English school of international studies. The English 
school is not a popular approach to international studies in Russia, where many scholars and 
decision-makers believe that international society is an instrument that helps Western na-
tions to pursue their interests, not an alliance based on shared values. Russian scholars and 
decision-makers do not view their relationship with any of the main stakeholders in the debate 
on Korean security, including the U.S., China, Japan, and two Korean states, as a relationship 
based on shared values. At the same time, Russian scholars and decision-makers admit that 
their country has some interests in common with all stakeholders of the debate on Korean 
security, including Japan. In Japan, the English school is a popular approach to international 
studies, and the belief that Japan belongs to the same international society as the U.S. is widely 
spread among both scholars and decision-makers. At the same time, the intensifying conflict 
between Japan and South Korea makes scholars and decision-makers in the former coun-
try believe that the relationship between the two countries is not grounded in shared values, 
despite some common interests. The Japanese-South Korean conflict, on the Asian border 
of international society, necessitates revisiting the issue of limits on the enlargement of the 
international society.
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Russian and Japanese approaches to the Korean Peninsula significantly differ not only 
from each other, but also from the approaches of other four most important participants of 
the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula, namely the two Korean states themselves, 
the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United States 
and the Chinese People’s Republic. The two Korean states approach security issues on and 
around the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of the relations between themselves; 
each of them expects their relations to develop towards unification of the Korean Penin-
sula [1; 2]. The U.S. and China also approach security issues on and around the Korean 
Peninsula from the viewpoint of the relations between themselves, namely their struggle 
for control of security agendas in Northeast Asia, in the Asia-Pacific Region as a whole, 
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and globally [3; 4]. Unlike the above-mentioned two couples, neither Russia nor Japan 
perceives security on and around the Korean Peninsula as a source of potential conflict for 
their bilateral relations. Thus, Russia and Japan together could play an important stabiliz-
ing role for security on and around the Korean Peninsula, if they could walk all the way 
from the present situation to working out of a common approach to the Korean puzzle.
In early 20th century, Russia and Japan used to clash over the Korean Peninsula. Con-
flicts over Korea and Manchuria were the main reasons of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–1905  [5; 6]. During the Korean War of 1950–1953, Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin at-
tempted to convince leaders of the Communist Party of Japan to pursue a revolution by 
force [7], which led to negative consequences for security in Japan domestically. After the 
Korean War, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic, political and economic relations 
with North Korea, while Japan maintained relations with South Korea. After the end of 
the Cold War, Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea while maintaining 
diplomatic relations with North Korea at the same time. Japan attempted talks on nor-
malization of relations with North Korea in early 1990s, though unsuccessfully. In the fol-
lowing thirty years, Japan failed to establish formal relations with North Korea, although 
Japanese officials have participated in talks with North Korean officials over North Korea’s 
nuclear programme and the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the 
Cold War. In early 21st century, despite Russian and Japanese approaches to North Korea 
are different, Russia and Japan do not any longer clash over the Korean Peninsula.
Another commonality between Russia and Japan is their position on opposite ends 
of the international society, with its centre in the Northern Atlantic. The concept of inter-
national society was born within the English School of international studies as a result of 
its attempt to bridge realism and liberalism as two dominant approaches to international 
studies in mid-20th century by means of “blending power with morality in international 
relations” [8, p. 3]. On one hand, the international society is an alliance, which is power-
ful. On other hand, unlike the alliances discussed in the writings of international rela-
tions scholars of realist orientation, the international society is not based on interests of 
the states participating in it, but on moral values shared in those states. Interests tend to 
change in the short run, while values remain unchanged even in the long run.
That explains durability of the Anglo-American alliance, the core of the internation-
al society. In late 19th century, when U.S. President McKinley was choosing America’s 
strategic ally in Europe, he chose Britain, because he did not perceive German Emperor 
Wilhelm II an “enlightened ruler” [9], Enlightment being considered an important value 
by the 25th U.S. President. One cannot help mentioning here that besides coincidence of 
values, coincidence of interests of the U.S. and Britain made the Anglo-American alliance 
possible. At the same time, lasting coincidence of values made the Anglo-American alli-
ance durable. To generalize, the international society is a durable alliance, and its durabil-
ity makes it even more powerful.
For proponents of the English School, the international society is key to understand-
ing of international relations. At the same time, there is no consent among proponents of 
the English School about the values forming the basis of the international society. Plu-
ralist concept of the international society is sometimes also referred to as “minimalist” 
concept of it, because it considers the international society a group of states, which have 
agreed on “certain minimalist rules, understandings and institutions designed to limit 
the inevitable conflict that was to be expected within such a fragmented political system” 
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[10, p. 7]. Proponents of that approach sometimes refer to the international society as to 
“Westphalian international society” with its minimalist but important rules, such as dip-
lomatic privileges, that most nations of the world are committed to. Some scholars have 
already started talking of “emerging post-Westphalian international society” (cf. [11]), in 
which sovereignty may remain an important value, but it will be understood differently in 
the international society, not as the only possible alternative to anarchy. Pluralist concept 
of the international society allows suggesting that a majority of contemporary nations 
belong to it.
To the contrary, solidarist, or “maximalist” concept places interests of the interna-
tional society as a whole above interests of individual states, of which it is made up. Pro-
ponents of that approach suggest that human rights and democracy are among the values, 
sharing of which opens the door into the international society for a particular nation. 
Maximising the scope of values that a nation “aspiring for membership in international 
society” [12] should commit to comes at a cost: only a minority of contemporary na-
tions belong to the society according to solidarist concept of it. Solidarist concept expects 
the international society to expand into the world society, which will consist of a major-
ity of nations sharing a maximum set of values. Today, however, proponents of that ap-
proach sometimes limit it to “European international society”, of which NATO [13] and 
the Council of Europe [14] are core institutions. Neither of those institutions is “liberal” 
in the sense that they are open to all nations willing to participate, but a nation can join 
either or both of them after having met certain criteria, which includes committing to a 
set of values in the core of the institutions.
Absence of consent about the core values of the international society combined with 
difficulties that some nations experience when aspiring to be recognized as members by its 
other members provides with the ground for some scholars to suggest that the core value 
of the international society is supremacy of its members, a minority of nations, over non-
members, a majority of nations. Vucetic [15] goes as far as to declare that supremacism 
was in the core of the Anglo-American alliance at the stage of its formation. Neumann 
[16] agrees that the idea of European superiority played an important role in shaping the 
core of the international society in the 19th century, and that the idea has not completely 
disappeared by late 20th century, though it took on a more refined form. Finally, Callaghan 
[17] ties the English school not only to national identity and common rules necessary for 
peaceful coexistence of nations, but also to the rules of a European Empire. From that 
angle, the international society appears to be an alliance of nations committed to solidar-
ist values, such as democracy and human rights, which, in their eyes, justifies violations 
of pluralist values by its members, for example, violations of sovereignty of non-members 
and of diplomatic privileges of their representatives.
Despite both Russia and Japan are equally far from the Northern Atlantic, their roles 
vis-à-vis the international society are different. It is more typical to perceive Russia as a 
non-member, despite some scholars from both Russia and countries of the international 
society have expressed regrets about it. For example, Kharkevich [18] regrets that Russia 
was a part of the international society in 1990s, but that it was “expelled” from it in early 
21st century. Such viewpoint is popular among Russian international relations scholars 
of liberal internationalist orientation. Many Western scholars, however, refuse to recog-
nize that Russia was a part of the international society for even a short period between 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, when “the failure of post-
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Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became evident” [19]. Rather, they attempt to find 
out the factors that prevented Russia from entering the international society. For example, 
Neumann [20] explains Russia’s inability to enter the international society with its soci-
ety’s memories about their country’s experience within the suzerain system of the Golden 
Horde, which prevent Russians from perceiving the international society as something 
different from another suzerain system.
It is typical to perceive Japan as a member of the international society, despite some 
scholars, primarily American scholars of neoconservative orientation, have recently ques-
tioned the strength of the bond tying Japan to America and thus to the international soci-
ety as a whole. For example, Calder [21, p. 117] points at mid-2000s as the time, when “the 
network dimension of the U. S. — Japan alliance has fallen into a quiet crisis”, the reasons 
of which were the decline of the share of Japanese-Americans among Asian-American 
population, limited travel and foreign study, eroding cultural ties between the elites of 
Japan and the U. S., as well as the rise of China, which provided with a third-country 
alternative to both Japan and the U.S. One cannot help admitting that China has indeed 
become a game-changer in U.S.  — Japanese relations, but its role should not be over-
estimated. Despite Chinese-Americans have outnumbered Japanese-Americans among 
Asian-American population in the U.S., in absolute numbers, Japanese-American popula-
tion in the U.S. was growing in early 21st century. Americans continued travelling to Japan, 
and Japanese continued travelling to the U.S. in large numbers, including for education. 
Erosion of cultural ties between the U.S. and Japan did not take place in early 21st century.
Russian Approach to the Korean Peninsula from the Societal Viewpoint
The English school is not a popular approach among Russian scholars of interna-
tional relations. Zaslavskaya and Averre [22], despite both sympathize the English school, 
do not find studies of the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe from the 
societal viewpoint among recent Russian literature on the subject. At the same time, mul-
tiple scholars outside of Russia have attempted studies of Russian relations with Asian 
countries, primarily those of Central Asia and East Asia, from the viewpoint of the English 
school. In particular, some of them tend to explain the differences between Russian poli-
cies in Asia and similar, at the first glance, policies of Western powers towards the same 
region pursued at the same time by the fact that Russia is not, in their view, a part of the 
international society. For example, Costa Buranelli [23] applies the English School’s ap-
proach to comparison of Russia’s expansion into Central Asia in 19th century with Western 
powers’ “civilizational” missions in their colonies pursued at the same time in order to 
come to the conclusion that the outcomes of Russia’s expansion were weaker due to its 
status of “less civilized civilizer” within the European concert of nations. Pourchot and 
Stivachtis [24] claim that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to divide the 
international society into two sub-global international societies with the Soviet Union and 
its allies forming one of them.
Soviet propaganda used the term “all progressive humankind” when referring to 
ethical superiority of the Soviet bloc’s “international society”. In Cold War times, the 
“international society” and “all progressive humankind” were the concepts identifying 
reference groups that the U.S. and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies respectively 
referred to in their rhetorical exchange. The “international society” condemned viola-
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tions of human rights in the Soviet Union and its allies while keeping a blind eye at simi-
lar violations in the U.S. and its allies. The “progressive humankind”, in turn, condemned 
prosecutions of activists in the U.S. and its allies while not noticing prosecutions of activ-
ists in the Soviet Union and its allies. That created the situation of hypocrisy, or “double 
standards”, in Soviet terminology, typical for the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, 
the concept of progressive humankind disappeared from international rhetoric, while 
the concept of the international society received a new meaning in early 21st century. 
However, even today findings of the English school are sometimes used for explanations 
of, for example, the differences in the approaches to Eurasian integration between Russia 
and Kazakhstan, of which the former pursues a Gemeinschaft-type of an international 
society, while the latter pursues a Gesellschaft-type of a society as the desired outcome of 
Eurasian integration [25].
Russian approach to East Asian affairs in general and to the Korean Peninsula in par-
ticular is significantly influenced by the difficulties that Russians experience when attempt-
ing to recognize the existence of shared values between themselves and major participants 
of the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula. One may say that Russian approach 
to the Korean Peninsula is influenced, on one hand, by its own Orientalist [26] discourse, 
which prevents many Russians from recognizing that they might share common values 
with Japanese, Koreans (both North and South Koreas) or Chinese. On other hand, it is 
influenced by Russian reaction to Western Orientalist discourse, which often treats Rus-
sia as Oriental, and which thus prevents many Russians from recognizing that they might 
share common values with people of the West, first of all and most importantly in relation 
to the Korean Peninsula, with Americans. Russia is not a unique community frustrated 
about being an object of Western Orientalist discourse and simultaneously a subject of its 
own Orientalist discourse. Likewise Russia, Turkey, another European “other”, according 
to Neumann [27], is, on one hand, frustrated about the fact that “in Eurocentric historical 
narratives, the Ottomans are represented as an abnormal entity or as the very opposite of 
Europeanness” [28], but, on other hand, it has “created its own Orient” [29].
The debate between Slavophiles and Westerners, which has been characterizing Rus-
sian ideological space since as long ago as 1830s, is still characteristic of it today [30]. Part 
of Russia’s elite perceives their country as a part of Europe, but another part perceives it as 
something different, most often as a Eurasian country. As a part of Europe, Russia belongs 
to Eastern Europe and thus becomes an object of Western European semi-Orientalist 
discourse justifying superiority of Western Europe over Easter Europe [31]. As a non-
Europe, Russia is big enough to become object of a separate Western discourse, which 
again bears semi-Orientalist features [32]. Those two discourses limit the ability of many 
representatives of American elite to recognize that they might share some common values 
with Russians, while the reaction to those two discourses, about which many representa-
tives of Russian elite are aware, limits their abilities to recognize that they might share 
some common values with Americans. Mutual inability to recognize their shared values 
“affects Russia-US interaction in the Asia Pacific and makes their cooperation on pressing 
security issues, such as North Korea, difficult” [33].
At the same time, Russia’s own Orientalist discourse limits the ability of its elite to 
recognize that they might share some common values with representatives of the elites of 
major Asian participants of the debate on security on the Korean Peninsula: China, both 
Korean states and Japan. Moreover, Russia’s own Orientalist discourse is one of the major 
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obstacles to success of the “turn to the East” in Russian foreign policy officially declared in 
mid-2010s after Russia’s relations with the West deteriorated thanks to the Ukraine crisis 
[34]. Despite so far Russia’s turn to the East has only brought limited fruit, some scholars 
have noticed the emergence of not yet common values shared by Russia and China, but 
of mutually acceptable rules of behaviour that both Russia and China are committed to in 
order to avoid a major conflict between them. According to Wishnick [35], “Sino-Russian 
great power management involves rule making, a distinctive approach to crisis manage-
ment, and overlapping policy approaches toward countries such as Burma and the Phil-
ippines”. In a similar manner, the understanding existing in both Russia and China that 
Central Asia is a foreign policy priority to both countries “has encouraged Beijing and 
Moscow to coordinate their policies across a wide range of issue areas” [36]. However, 
Russia and China have not yet worked out a common approach to the Korean Peninsula.
Russia maintains relations with both Korean states; however, both the essence and 
the meaning of the relations between Russia and South Korea and between Russia and 
North Korea significantly differ from each other. In the past, Russia and two Korean states 
have discussed possibilities of implementation of trilateral infrastructure projects, such 
as building of an oil and/or natural gas pipeline and a high-voltage electric power line 
connecting Russia and South Korea, whose economy heavily depends on energy imports, 
through the territory of North Korea. However, implementation of those projects at the 
moment looks problematic due to international sanctions imposed against North Korea 
and unpredictability of the North Korean regime. Russia maintains dialogue with North 
Korea on security issues, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, but 
cooperation in the field of hard security, including military cooperation, is impossible due 
to UN sanctions against North Korea. Cooperation in the field of soft security is not com-
pletely ruled out, but the ability “to cooperate on non-traditional security remains limited 
by both the absence of clear and mutually defined threats as well as differing approaches 
to non-traditional security issues” [37].
Russia cooperates with South Korea on a wide range of soft security issues and main-
tains dialogue on North Korean nuclear and missile programmes as well as on security 
in Northeast Asia in general. However, possibilities of cooperation in the field of hard 
security are limited due to South Korea’s alliance with the U.S. and U.S. troops being sta-
tioned on South Korean territory. Though Russia borders North Korea, it does not have a 
territorial dispute with it, but Russia has a territorial dispute with South Korea despite not 
bordering it. In 1990, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed a border treaty, according 
to which the border between them passed along the fairway of the Tumangan River, and 
the island of Noktundo became part of the Soviet Union. South Korea did not recognize 
that treaty; thus, Russia and South Korea dispute sovereignty of the island, despite that has 
not been a serious problem in Russian-South Korean relations practically. Possibilities of 
economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea are limited due to sanctions im-
posed against the latter. As to South Korea, it is Russia’s important economic partner and it 
is the second biggest economic partner of Russia’s Far East after China and ahead of Japan 
[38]. Russia very positively received the news that South Korea refused to introduce even 
formal sanctions against it in 2014, when most Western countries and Japan introduced 
sanctions against Russia.
Japan is an important economic partner of Russia; trade turnover exceeded U.S. 
$ 30 billion in early 2010s, it fell in mid-2010 due to Russia’s economic crisis, but it grew 
244 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 2
again in late 2010s, not least thanks to ratification of double tax treaty in 2018. Japan is 
also an important investor for Russia, though most of Japanese investments are focused 
on oil and natural gas projects on Sakhalin. Political relations between Russia and Japan 
improved by the end of 2010s, which can be regarded another outcome of Russia’s turn 
to the East policy. Russian scholars have assessed the improvement from the viewpoint 
of multiple theories of international relations, but not from the viewpoint of the English 
school [39]. What continues overshadowing Russian-Japanese relations, however, is the 
territorial dispute. Russia and Japan dispute sovereignty over four islands jointly known in 
Russia as Southern Kuril Islands; in Japan, they are commonly referred to as the Northern 
territories. Presence of U.S. troops is the most serious obstacle to solution of the bor-
der dispute between Russia and Japan: Russia fears that in case Japan obtains sovereignty 
over the disputed islands, U.S. troops could be stationed there, this constituting a security 
threat. It will be extremely difficult to resolve the territorial dispute between Russia and 
Japan as long as U.S. troops remain in Japan, which is expected to last also in the long run.
Japanese Approach to the Korean Peninsula 
from the Societal Viewpoint
Few if any Japanese scholars of international relations question their country’s be-
longing to the international society; the English school has been a popular approach to 
international studies in Japan at least since Hidemi Suganami, a Japanese-British scholar, 
introduced it to the country [40]. Today, Suganami is a prominent theorist in the field of 
English school in international studies [cf. 41]. Thus, one may wonder why Dunne [42, 
p. 128] did not mention Japan among the U.S., Canada, Australia, China, India and other 
countries, where there is significant interest in the work of the English school. Despite 
most Japanese universities and academic institutes attach greater value to publications 
of their faculty members and researchers in Japanese academic journals than in interna-
tional academic journals published in English, multiple Japanese professors in the field of 
international relations have gained international prominence thanks to their works on in-
ternational society. In this respect, Yuichi Hosoya (cf. [43]) cannot help being mentioned, 
among many others. International society is one of the most popular central themes of 
graduate programmes in the field of international relations offered at Japanese universi-
ties, together with global governance and global citizenship.
Academic journal “International Relations of the Asia-Pacific” published by Oxford 
University Press in association with Japan Association of International Relations actively 
publishes results of research of the role of Japan in international relations grounded in 
the concepts and methods that have been worked out within the English school (cf. [44]). 
Proponents of both solidarist and pluralist concepts of international society can be found 
among Japanese scholars of international relations; for example, Nakano [45] discusses 
the debate before siding with the pluralist concept. Japanese scholars considering their 
country a member of the international society can be found among proponents of both 
pluralist and solidarist concepts of international society. Multiple academic accounts pre-
sent Japanese entry into the international society as a long way, which began in the Meiji 
era; many scholars point at difficulties that Japan faced on that way (cf. [46]). Some schol-
ars consider Japanese role in international relations in the first half of the 20th century as 
a case of “regional differentiation within international society” (cf. [47]). After the end of 
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WWII, Japan became full member of the international society in both pluralist and soli-
darist meanings of the concept.
The belief that Japan belongs to the international society together with the United 
States, and that Russia, China and North Korea do not belong to the international soci-
ety seriously influences Japanese approach to the Korean Peninsula. Likewise all other 
stakeholders in the negotiations on security on and around the Korean Peninsula, ex-
cept for North Korea itself, Japan wants North Korea to denuclearize unilaterally, fully 
and unconditionally. According to Casarini and Tsuruoka [48, p. 59], “the biggest rea-
son why Tokyo regards proliferation as a major, grave or significant threat to Japan is 
North Korea’s nuclear missile development, which represents a clear and present dan-
ger”. However, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme is not the only issue that 
Japan is concerned about on the Korean Peninsula. Another unresolved issue in the 
relations between Japan and North Korea is the abduction of Japanese citizens by North 
Korean secret services during the Cold War. In 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi visited North Korea; five victims returned to Japan as a result of this visit, but 
Japan insists that many more people were abducted besides the thirteen people that 
North Korea recognizes.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes were the main reason, why Japan de-
cided to consider the possibility to deploy elements of U.S. anti-missile defence system 
on its territory, despite fears of U.S.-Chinese strategic arms race as a consequence of the 
deployment. Jimbo, a Japanese scholar, expects a U.S.-Chinese, but not a U.S.-Russian 
strategic arms race to begin in case of the deployment, because Russia and the U.S. both 
value strategic disarmament, which influenced their bilateral relations, including in the 
form of signing of the Treaty of Moscow in 2002 [49, p. 61]. One might read the Jimbo’s 
article as recognition that Russia, despite not belonging to the international society from 
the solidarist viewpoint, belongs to it (or at least used to belong to it in 2002) from the 
pluralist viewpoint. Russia is committed (or at least it was committed in 2002) to minimal 
set of values helpful of decreasing probability of the beginning of a major armed conflict; 
for nuclear nations, this minimal set of values includes the value of nuclear disarmament. 
One might consider that another starting point for working out of a common approach to 
the Korean Peninsula between Japan and Russia.
The concept of the international society also helps understanding the ambiguity of 
contemporary relations between Japan and South Korea. It is not clear whether Japanese 
elite, the majority of which perceives their country as belonging to the international soci-
ety, considers South Korea another member of the international society. On one hand, in 
2014, the Diplomatic Bluebook, a strategic foreign policy document annually published 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, named Japan and South Korea “the most im-
portant neighboring countries to each other, which share fundamental values such as free-
dom, democracy, and respect for basic human rights” [50, p. 13]. The fundamental values 
that the document considers being shared by Japan and South Korea are exactly the values 
that any member of the international society shares according to the solidarist concept 
of it. One might read the document as a proof that Japanese Foreign Ministry recognizes 
(or, at least, used to recognize in 2014) South Korea as another part of the international 
society, together with Japan itself. That might be part of the explanation, why Japan is 
more supportive of South Korean stance at negotiations concerning North Korea’s nuclear 
programme than it is of North Korean stance.
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However, if Japanese elite ever perceived South Korea as another member of the in-
ternational society, it does not influence greatly Japanese approach to problematic issues 
of bilateral relations with South Korea. Two major problems overshadow the relations be-
tween Japan and South Korea: a territorial dispute and a dispute over the legacy of the first 
half of the 20th century in Japanese-Korean relations. Japan and South Korea dispute sov-
ereignty over a group of islets in the Japanese Sea, which is called the Eastern Sea in Korea; 
those islets are known collectively as Takeshima in Japan and as Dokdo in South Korea, on 
Western maps they sometimes appear as the Liancourt Rocks. Japan used to occupy the 
Korean Peninsula between 1910 and 1945; after WWII, Japan has repeatedly apologized 
for its actions during the period and has provided substantial monetary compensation to 
victims. However, South Korea repeatedly raised the issue and demanded more apolo-
gies and compensations. Also, South Korea condemns ceremonial visits of Japanese Prime 
Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which is a Shinto Shrine dedicated to war dead, 
who served the Emperor of Japan since the Meiji Restauration through WWII, including 
fourteen people categorized as “Class A War Criminals” by the International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East of 1946-1948, commonly known as the Tokyo Tribunal.
Similar problems overshadow also the relations between Japan and China. Japan and 
China dispute sovereignty over a group of islets in East China Sea known as Senkaku in 
Japan and as Diaoyu  in China. China repeatedly raises the issue of Japanese actions in 
China between 1894 and 1945 and demands apologies and compensations. China con-
demns Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine and expresses concerns over 
presentation of the events of 1894-1945  in Japanese history textbooks. The reaction of 
Japanese society to South Korean foreign policy actions concerning those conflicts is not 
very different from the reaction of Japanese society to similar Chinese actions, despite one 
might expect that the reaction to South Korean actions could be softer, if Japanese society 
considered South Korea belonging to the international society, to which Japan belongs, 
too. For example, Igarashi [51] compared the changes in public attitudes in Japan towards 
China and South Korea after Chinese activists landed on Senkaku / Diaoyu and South 
Korean politicians landed on Takeshima/Dokdo in 2012 and found more similarities than 
differences between the two situations. Japanese public did not perceive the South Korean 
move as a lesser threat to Japan than the Chinese move.
Japanese-South Korean relations significantly deteriorated in the first years of Moon 
Jae-in’s presidency in South Korea. Worsening of Japanese-South Korean relations in early 
21st century typically takes place during the term of a left-wing president in South Korea. 
Usually, right-wing presidents of South Korea lean towards pro-American foreign policy, 
which includes friendly relations with all U.S. allies in Asia, and the most important U.S. 
ally in Asia is Japan. To the contrary, left-wing president of South Korea lean towards 
more independent (from the U.S.) foreign policy, thus allowing nationalistic anti-Japanese 
sentiments to prevail over loyalty to existing alliances. It was during the presidency of 
left-wing Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea in 2003–2008, when tensions between Japan and 
South Korea intensified.
Two subsequent right-wing Presidents of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak 
and Park Geun-hye, attempted to improve Japanese-South Korean relations, and above-
quoted account of Japanese-South Korean relations by the Japanese Foreign Ministry of 
2014 might be a result of their policies. With the impeachment of Park Geun-hye and with 
election of Moon Jae-in, Japanese-South Korean relations worsened again. In addition to 
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sharpening controversies over Takeshima / Dokdo and over memories about WWII and 
preceding events, characteristic of Moon Jae-in’s presidency was the Japanese-South Ko-
rean trade war, which began in 2019. As a result, the Diplomatic Bluebook in 2019 did not 
mention any shared values between Japan and South Korea; to the contrary, it described 
2018 as the year, when “Japan and the Republic of Korea faced an extremely severe situa-
tion amid a series of negative moves by…” South Korea [52, p. 41]. As of 2019, Japan did 
not consider South Korea a member of the international society.
Conclusions
Despite its low popularity in Russia, where many scholars and decision-makers per-
ceive the international society as a Western concept introduced with the aim to advance 
the interests of self-proclaimed members of the international society among Western na-
tions, the English school of international relations is a popular approach to international 
studies in Japan. Multiple Japanese scholars apply the approaches of the English school 
to their analysis of international relations, both on the regional level, in East Asia, and 
globally. In the United Kingdom, the birthplace of the English school, proponents of the 
English school do not turn to empirical evidence from Japan very often, but they do not 
neglect Japanese experience entirely either. The debate between proponents of the min-
imalist and maximalist concepts of the international society, which is going on in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere, takes place in Japan, too. While some Japanese scholars 
perceive their country as belonging to the international society with the centre in North-
ern Atlantic thanks to the values shared by Japanese, Americans and Europeans, others 
approach the international society from the minimalist viewpoint and refuse to place uni-
versal values above Japanese interests.
From the societal viewpoint, Russian approach to security on and around the Korean 
Peninsula is influenced by presumed lack of shared values with main stakeholders of the 
debate on Korean security: the U.S., China, Japan and the two Korean states. Ongoing 
conflict with the West prevents most Russian decision-makers and scholars from seeing 
the values they share with Americans. Orientalist discourse prevents them from seeing the 
values they share with Japanese and Koreans. Even the “strategic alliance” between Russia 
and China, thanks to Russian Orientalist discourse, is perceived in Russia as a common-
interests-based, not a shared-values-based alliance. Japanese approach to security on and 
around the Korean Peninsula is influenced by presumed Japan’s belonging to the interna-
tional society based on shared values, members of which are also the United States and 
(until recently) South Korea, but to which China, North Korea or Russia do not belong. In 
the U.S. itself, the perception of Japan as a part of the international society is also widely 
spread, despite some American scholars mostly of neoconservative orientation have re-
cently expressed their concern over a “quite crisis” of the shared-values-based bond con-
necting Japan to the U.S., despite of insufficient evidence that could support such claims.
While the bond between Japan and the U.S. remains firm, the bond between Japan 
and South Korea has recently turned fragile. Recently, Japan and South Korea exchanged 
heated rhetoric on their territorial dispute and the legacy of the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, as well as found themselves on edge of a trade war. On one hand, the current crisis 
in Japanese-South Korean relations is an outcome of the policies of Moon Jae-in, the left-
wing South Korean President since 2017. Past experience demonstrates that Japanese-
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South Korean relations tend to worsen in times, when South Korea has a left-wing presi-
dent. One may expect that the relations between the two will improve if a right-wing 
president comes to replace Moon Jae-in in Seoul in 2022. If the crisis in Japanese-South 
Korean relations continues beyond Moon Jae-in’s presidency, it will have an important 
impact on security on and around the Korean Peninsula. Main stakeholders of the debate 
on Korean security, including Russia and China, will have to adapt to the changing situa-
tion. Also, it will pose a challenge to the U.S., which is the most important strategic ally to 
both Japan and South Korea. Last but not least, it will challenge proponents of the English 
school of international studies to revisit limits to enlargement of the international society.
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